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Anchored on scholarly literature on international competitiveness and the classical definition of
competitiveness as net exports, policy making institutions support decentralized wage-setting
mechanisms. The rationale is that decentralized wage-setting systems lower wages and unit labor costs
(ULC) and, therefore, increase net exports. This paper contains a literature review on the wagesetting–ULC–net exports link and challenges conventional rationales by examining the co-evolution of
Belgium’s real wages and net exports across wage percentiles and sectors. Belgium is a case in point,
since the country experienced both increasing real wages and increasing net exports after recentralizing
wage-setting mechanisms in 2008.
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Introduction
Scholarly and institutional literature on international competitiveness mainly uses countries’ net
exports or current account balances as a measure of their competitiveness and/or economic
soundness (following this template, here current account balance and net exports are used
interchangeably). As such, mainstream economic research deems countries with higher current
account balances more competitive than countries with lower net exports, arguing that such export
success is to be achieved though lower export prices, wages, and unit labor costs. In line with the
literature, most EU countries have progressively adopted decentralized wage-setting mechanisms.
Economists point out Germany as an empirical example of the wonders that low unit labor
costs can work on net exports, since the country has held the position of number one exporter in
Europe for several years; they hold it as the golden standard for competitiveness in the EU, with
international institutions designing German-inspired policy recommendations for a diverse group
of nations. Some economists have pointed to labor market characteristics and decentralized wagesetting mechanisms as the reasons accounting for Germany’s (and other nations’) export success
(Dustmann et. al, 2014), which has led others to generalize decentralized wage bargaining as a
one-size-fits-all solution to meager exports. The reasoning behind this rationale is that
decentralized wage-setting leads to lower salaries, which in turn lower the costs of exported goods,
making them more appealing to foreigners and raising the country’s trade balance and
competitiveness.
However, several problems arise in this analysis: 1) it is not clear that a country’s trade
balance as opposed to other economic indicators is a good measure of its international
competitiveness 2) Germany’s high exports cannot be justified solely on its labor market and
wage-setting policies 3) Germany’s export success is not without its disadvantages both at national
and EU level, and 4) some countries’ net exports have risen even after the implementation of
centralized wage-setting mechanisms. Each of these observations is analyzed in this paper to
conclude that 1) decentralized wage-setting systems are not incompatible with high net exports,
Belgium being a case in point, as product quality, real exchange rates, investment incentives, and
resistance to imports also affect current account balances and 2) given the subjective nature of the
concept of competitiveness, it might be preferable for national governments to determine their
policy-making agenda based on whichever definition of “international competitiveness” best fits
their country’s needs, strengths, and values, instead of adopting other nations’ or mainstream
competitiveness-oriented policies.
An emphasis is put on Belgium as one of the few European countries to have adopted more
centralized wage-setting mechanisms after the 2008 crisis and to have seen rising wages as well
as rising net exports thereafter. The fact that Belgium moved against the present trend of
progressive wage-setting decentralization makes the country one of those economic natural
experiments which economists so anxiously await and deeply adore. The unusual character of such
a move added to the fact that the country’s net exports increased, despite the predictions of
conventional economic theory, make Belgium’s labor market much worthy of analysis.
Section 1.0 The history of the concept “competitiveness”
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International competitiveness has been viewed from two perspectives: a micro (competition among
firms) and a macro (national) one. The latter is to be interpreted as a means to an end: raising
citizens’ real income and standard of living, through investment, trade, and economic production,
although international trade performance has been the main measure of international
competitiveness. The macro definition of competitiveness has its origins in Ricardo’s theory of
comparative advantage and Heckscher-Ohlin’s factor abundance theorem, whereby countries
specialize in the production of goods they manufacture more efficiently and trade them for goods
that other nations can produce more cheaply. In this view, relative prices are the only factor
underlying trade flows, since a country’s comparative advantage in producing one good means it
is able to export it at a price lower to that of its competitors. Later theories of international trade
added a broad array of economic factors to Ricardo’s analysis, such as labor productivity, capital
output ratio, research and development, differences in human capital, and real wages, giving rise
to the new “neotechnology theories”. Given that the price of exports affects foreigners’ taste (or
distaste) for such goods, and that labor costs affect this price greatly, it was argued that lower unit
labor costs (UCL) would translate into cheaper and therefore larger exports. The consideration of
an increasing number of economic variables in trade flows analysis generated a need for agreement
on a measure of nations’ competitiveness, to facilitate cross-countries analysis among economists
and institutions. After several proposals of economic indicators by research and financial
institutions, relative unit labor costs were adopted as the standard measure of international
competitiveness. Soon after, however, several economists concluded that variables concerning
national industries, innovation, and a specific country’s socio-economic and political goals might
be of greater importance in studies of international competitiveness (Waheeduzzaman and John K.
Ryans Junior, 1996).
Still, a great portion of contemporary scholarly economic literature defines
competitiveness in terms of ULC and net exports. International institutions such as the ECB, the
European Commission, and the IMF also refer to current account balances to measure a given
country’s competitiveness in their publications. Indeed, a 2008 ECB report read: “Cumulative
increases in labor costs across euro area countries can be indicative of growing imbalances and
losses in competitiveness and, as such, are an important early sign of the need for adjustment.
Relative developments in labor costs across the euro area countries, together with other indicators
of competitiveness, have therefore to be closely monitored”. However, as mentioned before, some
economists have formulated different yet not less valid definitions of competitiveness, some
examples being Porter’s work on research, firm innovation, and knowledge creation (Porter 1990),
and Reiljan, Hinrikus, Ivanov’s appeal to strategic government investment in underdeveloped
socio-economic and equality of opportunities (Reiljan, Hinrikus, Ivanov, 2000). The
aforementioned economists’ work deserves attention, because it underlines the fact that some
countries might very well be extremely competitive while not being considered so under traditional
economic views. In other words, there is room for economists, national governments, and
international institutions to disagree on which definition of competitiveness fits a country’s
specific conditions best without engaging in unfounded, unreasonable discourse. As such, their
research results suggest that national governments must develop their own clear, idiosyncratic
definition of competitiveness, so to: firstly, design intentional policy plans that fit their country’s
economic conditions well, then identify those aspects of their country’s economy which are
underdeveloped, and finally channel investment in those directions.
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In his 1990 article The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Michael E. Porter argued that a
nation’s competitiveness relies on the degree to which its industry will be able innovate, when
challenged by other firms or economic conditions. In his view, “companies benefit from having
strong domestic rivals, aggressive home-based suppliers, and demanding local customers”,
because this forces them to upgrade (Porter, 1990). Under Porter’s definition of competitiveness,
countries with negative trade balances but entrepreneurial business environments will be
considered competitive. The U.S., for example, has been running fiscal deficits since 1970, except
for 1998 to 2001, and holds the worlds’ highest current account deficit, but is widely considered
one of the strongest economies today. In fact, very few would argue the U.S. is not competitive in
the international arena. In line with Porter’s view on competitiveness, such could be justified by
its unmatched technological and research development – the world’s biggest tech companies, such
as Microsoft, Apple, and Intel are headquartered in Silicon Valley – and the incentives put in place
to foster entrepreneurial, innovative activities, such as government distributed patents.
Simultaneously, an “alternative” definition of competitiveness should not be employed as an easy
way to justify reckless fiscal policy.
In their work on competitiveness, economists Janno Reiljan, Maria Hinrikus, Anneli
Ivanov argue that an optimal strategy to increase competitiveness needs to balance developmental
aspects at a general, societal, industrial, and regional level. Their final recommendation for
national governments is that when designing policies concerning each of these levels, they should
decide whether to uniformize opportunities or invest more on relatively underdeveloped areas.
This line of work on competitiveness argues that equality of opportunities and/or strategic
government investment as well as a clearly defined political agenda for development are the basis
for competitiveness. On this vein, one could argue that, for example, Northern European countries,
with universal basic income and which have a differentiated investment agenda with more funds
allocated to underdeveloped regions are more competitive than countries with stark regional and
social differences in development levels. Nonetheless, some of these Northern countries, for
instance Finland hold negative current accounts.
Even a hypothetical consensus on competitiveness as net exports would not suffice to settle
the age-old debate over international competitiveness, since there is also the question of exactly
which price index captures export performance more accurately, which researchers have been
pondering (e.g. 2006 Deutsche Bundesbank report The impact of alternative indicators
of price competitiveness on real exports of goods and services). Divergences over the true
definition of competitiveness are not restricted to economists, however, as European national
governments’ views on the matter differ from those of international institutions such as the ECB,
the European Commission, and the IMF.
Since the 1980’s, European countries have followed a trend of decentralization of wagesetting mechanisms, which has been accentuated by the 2008 financial crisis, with the ECB, the
European Commission (EC), and the IMF including decentralization policies in their
recommendation packages to EU nations (Eurofound report, 2014). Even when following the
wage-bargaining decentralization policies designed by these international institutions, European
national governments’ expectations about the effects of such policies do not align with the goals
of the ECB, EC, and IMF.
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When interviewed by the Eurofound (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living
and Working Conditions), members of European national governments highlighted macroeconomic and micro-economic factors as well as recommendations or requirements from the
European Commission and/or the ECB and/or the IMF as the main contributors to policy changes
in wage-setting mechanisms after the 2008 financial crisis. Macro-economic factors pertain, for
example wage moderation while micro-economic ones relate to the adaptability of firms.
Export prices and trade balance are the macro-economic variables commonly used to make the
argument that decentralization of wage-setting mechanisms increases competitiveness as well as
the targets of decentralization policies designed by international institutions, because they rely on
the traditional definition of competitiveness. So, one would expect correspondents to have claimed
that macro-economic factors were a more important contributor to policy changes in wage-setting
mechanisms than micro-economic goals. Nonetheless, out of the four national governments that
reported state policies, recommendations, and requirements from the EC, ECB, and/or IMF
influenced their wage-setting policy-making, only one country, Belgium, also reported being
influenced by macro-economic factors, with most correspondents referring to micro-economic
motivations for decentralization in wage bargaining.
This incoherence could be attributed to the fact that governments believe their country will
increase its competitiveness if national firms become more flexible and adapt more easily to
changing market conditions, that is, through micro-economic competitiveness, whereas
international institutions believe the same goal of international competitiveness can be achieved
through the macro-economic channel of wage moderation and cheaper exports. Ironically, macroeconomic factors were reported to be influential in the two countries – Belgium and Finland –
which have experienced centralization in wage-setting arrangements, precisely the opposite policy
route that institutions relying on macro-economic arguments of competitiveness would
recommend. Nonetheless, other national governments’ views on competitiveness seem to align
well with those of international institutions. In Ireland, for example, the break-up of national
bargaining was reported to have been motivated in part by macro-economic reasons (securing
wage moderation).
Ultimately, because the concept of competitiveness is political and subjective, it is up to
each national government to establish priorities for effective economic investment and policy
making based on its own considerations of which sectors or investment practices align best with
their national goals and values.
For clarity’s sake and given that this paper relies on data from European institutions, which
mostly employ the traditional definition of competitiveness, here the term “competitiveness”
relates to a country’s trade balance, unless otherwise specified.
Section 1.1 Can the traditional definition of competitiveness be detrimental?
Of course, besides the question of whether the traditional definition of competitiveness as net
exports is theoretically correct, there is also the issue of whether pursuing policies based on it
might actually weaken a country’s economy (rather than being neutral). In this spirit, a 2006 IMF
country report analyzing Germany’s high trade balance (Exports and Domestic Demand in
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Germany: Has the Nexus been Altered by Globalization) raises the question of whether the
country’s strong exports are actually a sign of structural weaknesses in its economy.
Explicitly, the IMF report uses economist Sinn’s work to argue that Germany’s large
current account surplus reflects internal economic weaknesses and the export of capital. Sinn’s
thesis (paraphrased in the report) is that the move towards globalization represented a
competitiveness shock to the German economy, but that due to labor market rigidities, wages were
sluggish to respond and became high vis-à-vis foreign wages. Labor-intensive exporting sectors
failed due to high labor costs and had to release excessive labor supply, causing German
unemployment to rise. The freed-up labor was not absorbed in the services sector, because services
wage costs were too high and labor mobility tends to be too low. In summary, “Because adjustment
in the domestic labor market is drawn out, specialization in capital-intensive/exporting sectors
overshoots, and investment and employment in domestic service-oriented sectors undershoots”
(IMF report, 2006 citing Sinn 2006). As a result of globalization, firm capital largely moved abroad
to be combined with less expensive foreign labor. So, in this view, Germany’s large current
account surplus is a sign of insufficient conditions and incentives for investment in domestic nontradable sectors.
To make the logical jump from this point to Germany’s high net exports, the IMF’s report
implicitly leans on the three-panel diagram macroeconomic model, according to which higher net
exports and a lower exchange rate mean higher net capital outflows (NCO) and lower domestic
interest rates. Given that NCO equals net exports (euros of capital invested in the foreign country
will be used to buy German products in euros), positive and high NCO implies by definition that
institutions and/or households have a preference to invest capital abroad rather than domestically.
Consequently, the criticism with which one may address the three-panel diagram is also to some
extent valid for the rationale exposed on the IMF’s report. Thus, one counterargument to Sinn’s
conclusion could be that German investments in foreign countries does not necessarily provoke
higher exports: for example, consumer preferences might limit foreigners’ demand of German
goods, regardless of German capital investments in that country. One other question to be raised
is: if foreign wages are lower and if globalization increased German unemployment, decreasing
the purchasing power of at least the unemployed why aren’t exports from those countries (imports
from the German perspective) also cheaper and preferred by Germans? That is to ask: why wasn’t
an increase in imports counterbalanced by Germany’s strong exports? (see section 4.0 for a brief
overview of German imports resistance)
It’s also worth drawing attention to the fact that even though high Germany’s high net
exports are attributed to its low wages, the IMF report exposes the gap between higher German
and lower foreign wages as the motor of their strong exports. This apparent paradox thus supports
the view that the link between wages and exports is not as simple as European economic policy
might wish it to be.
Section 2.0 – The History of German labor market reforms
As of 2017, Germany was Europe’s largest exporter, followed by France, and the Netherlands,
with Italy taking fourth place, and is therefore held as the golden standard for competitiveness in
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the EU. There, since 2005, unemployment rates have steadily decreased, and participation rates
increased. Since 2011, labor compensation has increased moderately. Although the main economic
indicators featured in the literature on Germany’s exceeding competitiveness are the country’s unit
labor costs, export prices, and trade balance, for many years, the key challenge for Germany was
to reduce high and persistent unemployment. Indeed, the continuous rise in unemployment until
the mid-2000s, which earned Germany the nickname of “sick man of Europe” at the time, can
clearly be seen in Figure 1. Germany’s route from the unemployment trap of the early 2000s to
becoming an “economic superstar” has received global attention. Its labor market robustness to
the impacts of the 2008 Great Recession (unemployment changed very little as a result of the crisis)
has also caught policy-makers eye. It has therefore been argued that Germany could be a reference
model for nations with labor market turmoil (Schneider and Rinne, 2017).
Germany’s past unemployment rate has often been linked to high employment protection,
high labor costs, and strictly regulated labor markets. In this context, the labor market reforms (the
2003-2005 “Hartz reforms”) are considered to have played an important role in reducing
unemployment. Under the reforms, flexible forms of employment such as fixed term contracts,
temporary agency work, and marginal employment became more attractive, unemployment
benefits duration for the elderly was lowered, and all welfare recipients considered able to work
were included in activation schemes. Intermediate forms of unemployment compensation were
abolished, and item-wise approved welfare payments were replaced by a monthly lump-sum,
lowering unemployment benefits and making monitoring activities for the unemployed stricter.
Hence, matching between unemployed workers and job vacancies accelerated. In conclusion, the
labor market reforms successfully reduced unemployment by incentivizing job search, abolishing
ineffective policy instruments such as job creation schemes, and enforcing the requirements for
the unemployed to prove ongoing job search efforts. (Schneider and Rinne, 2017).
Another factor which lowered Germany’s youth unemployment rates was the dual
apprenticeship system, which besides providing skills and qualifications in demand, also reduced
facilitated school-to-work transitions. Increased participation rates among older workers, mainly
triggered by the labor market reforms, which effectively reduced monetary incentives for early
retirement also contributed to decrease unemployment. Moreover, unions and employers
increasingly used the collective bargaining process to arrive at more flexible labor arrangements
via opening clauses in contracts between unions and employers’ associations, which were valid
during financial crisis (Schneider and Rinne, 2017).
Currently, the German system of industrial relations is laid out in contracts and mutual
agreements between trade unions, employer associations, and works councils - the worker
representatives who are typically present in medium-sized and large firms (Dustmann,
Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener, 2014). In Germany, wage-setting is quite decentralized,
with contractual agreements on wages, wage floors, and working time between unions and
employers being periodically negotiated on the region-industry or firm level, without government
interference. In fact, Germany had had no minimum wage imposed by the political process until
2015. Consequently, as Dustmann et. al argue, “negotiations are usually far more consensus-based
and less confrontational than in other countries. For example, Germany lost on average 11 days of
work each year per 1,000 employees by strikes and lock-outs between 1991 and 1999, but only
five days per 1,000 employees between 2000 and 2007. These figures for the earlier and later time
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period compare to 40 and 32
days per 1,000 employees in
the United States, 30 and 30
days in the United Kingdom,
73 and 103 days in France,
158 and 93 days in Italy, and
220 and 164 days in Canada
(Dustmann et. al 2014 citing
Lesch 2009)” (Dustmann,
Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and
Spitz-Oener, 2014).
A distinguishing feature of
German labor markets are the
opening
clauses
in
employment
contracts
introduced by the Kratz
Fig 1. Germany’s unemployed workers, 1970-2016 source: Schneider and
reforms. Indeed, even within
Rinne, 2017
industry level union wage
contracts,
“opening”
or
“hardship” clauses allow for
wage renegotiation at the firm level in times of financial distress, provided that workers’
representatives agree. Such clauses also mean that German firms can choose whether or not to
recognize a given trade union as well as union’s wage bargaining contracts. Furthermore, German
firms that recognized union contracts in the past can opt out at their own discretion. In summary,
such policies allow for the possibility of wage renegotiations or layoffs during financial turmoil,
increasing firm adaptability to changing economic conditions.
Germany’s labor market has increasingly moved from industry or region level wage bargaining to
firm-level negotiations, that is towards decentralized wage-setting, as from 1995 to 2008, the share
of employees covered by industry-wide agreements fell from 75 to 56 percent, while the share
covered by firm-level agreements fell from 10.5 to 9 percent (Dustmann, Fitzenberger, Schönberg,
and Spitz-Oener, 2014). Dustmann et al. attribute Germany’s evolution in the direction of more
flexible labor markets and decentralized wage-setting to the German reunification and to
globalization. Their argument is that Eastern migration exerted downward pressure on wages and
that the opportunity to move production abroad (which globalization generated) discouraged
German firms to pay high union wages. Firms’ disincentives to pay high wages forced unions
and/or works councils to become willing to negotiate pay rates directly with companies and to
accept deviations from industry-wide labor agreements, which often translated into lower wages
for workers.
Section 2.1 – A reflection on Germany’s unemployment reduction miracle
Germany’s move towards increased labor market flexibility and decentralized wage-bargaining
seems to have succeeded in reducing unemployment via the Kratz reforms, the government’s goal.
In my view, such results were achieved, because, from the unemployed workers’ perspective, the
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reforms substantially lowered unemployment benefits, incentivizing job search. From the
perspective of the firms, the reforms allowed for companies to both layoff but also hire workers
quicker, increasing the speed at which matching between unemployed workers and jobs took place.
Additionally, the fact that companies can recognize union wage-contracts at their own discretion
effectively constitutes a significant transfer of power from employees to firms, since it often forces
workers to accept lower wages, which reduces production costs and could increase firms’ profits
or decrease the final price of the goods they produce. A causal link between such reforms and
Germany’s export success via cheaper exports, however, is not by any means clear, since it is
possible that German firms chose to add on the difference between the older, higher wages and the
later, lower ones to their profits instead of lowering their exportable products’ prices. Note that
lower export prices are required for traditional views of competitiveness as cheap and abundant
exports to hold. Germany’s superior export performance could be due to other factors entirely.
Moreover, one could argue that lower wages reduce households’ purchasing power, which can
hurt firms’ profits, given that, according to a Keynesian view of the world, such reduces aggregate
demand, slowing down economic growth (despite also reducing imports along with demand for
other goods). Nonetheless, advocates of wage-setting decentralization have used Germany’s labor
market evolution to argue that such systems are superior to centralized ones. I believe the
conclusion that Germany’s decentralized wage-setting is the reason behind its strong exports is
erroneous. In my view, it ultimately stems from the fact that institutions such as the IMF, the ECB
or the EC have not been able to identify the mismatch between the target economic variable of the
Kratz reforms which they copy to a certain extent (unemployment) and the target of their wagedecentralization policy recommendations (exports). Recommending German-style reforms to
other governments, erroneously treating such policy packages as one-size-fits-all, can be
problematic, because implementing the same labor market policies in economic environments
different from the one where those policies succeeded and in order to reach a goal different from
the one its original designers had in mind is not only incoherent but also likely to lead to
unexpected outcomes.
Similarly, as mentioned in section 1.0, national governments also implement international
institutions’ policy recommendations expecting to achieve micro-economic goals while the policy
designers at those institutions wrote them with a macro-economic mindset. If such goals cannot be
achieved simultaneously, this divergence most likely will lead to disappointment from either
party’s side (whoever fails to reach its objective) and successive changes in policies.
Section 3.0 The wage-setting mechanisms – ULC – exports connection
Decentralization of wage-setting mechanisms is widely associated with lower unit labor costs and
consequently cheaper exports and a stronger trade balance, so much so that after the financial crisis
of 2008, a great number of European countries shifted their wage-setting mechanisms towards
more decentralized ones, in an attempt to become more competitive. As we read in a 2014 report
from Eurofound: “The prevalence of decentralization since the onset of the crisis continues and
has accelerated; it is the predominant tendency in the evolution of wage setting mechanisms
observed since the late 1980s.” However, other economists have argued that the link between
wage-setting mechanisms, unit labor costs, and exports is actually weak. In this section, I present
an overview of the literature on the decentralization-ULC-exports connection.
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The traditional economic view on the ULC-exports link is that globalization and its
associated increase in international competitiveness have made exports more sensitive to costs.
Thus, “the focus on unit labor costs as a measure for competitiveness is based on the idea that
increases in unit labor costs are passed on in the form of higher export prices, resulting in a
deterioration in the balance of payments, hampering economic growth and increasing
unemployment” (Decramer, Fuss, Konings, 2016).
In the specific case of Germany, while some economists argue that the Kratz reforms played a role
in increasing the country’s exports, as mentioned in the previous section, German economist
Christian Dustmann et al. makes the argument that the reforms succeeded in creating incentives
for seeking employment but “did little to support the remarkable wage restraint witnessed since
the mid 1990s, which is the key factor in explaining the gain in competitiveness” (Dustmann,
Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener, 2014).
Instead, Dustmann et al. argue that proximity of labor unions to firms and flexible, decentralized
wage and labor contract negotiations are the true reasons behind Germany’s export success. The
specific structural parameters of German industrial relations, they argue, allowed for an
unprecedented decentralization of the wage setting process, leading to a decrease in real wages,
especially at the lower end of the wage distribution. The sharp decline in the share of workers
covered by union agreements and the increase in opening clauses that strengthened the role of
firm-based works councils in wage determination relative to trade unions, they argue, contributed
to this development.
Apparently contrary to this view, data from the IMF and the ECB show that German unit
labor costs had been rising even before the 2008 financial crisis. A perplexing fact indeed: how
does Germany manage to keep number one place as Europe’s biggest exporter while its ULC and
export prices increase? Dustmann et al. explain this observation, by analyzing the evolution of
ULC across separate sectors individually, namely non-tradable sectors, tradable manufacturing,
tradable services. The IMF and ECB, on the contrary, account for the evolution of wages across
all sectors without cross-sector distinctions. The graphs in figure 2 show that, while German wages
in tradable manufacturing have increased since 1990, wages in non-tradable sectors and tradable
services have decreased since 1998 and 2004, respectively. Dustmann et al. use these results to
explain why German exports have remained competitive even after wages in some sectors
increased. The value added to exported products in manufacturing, they argue, is only roughly
one-third of the value of the end product, with the remainder value coming from other industries’
inputs (domestic or foreign). So, the manufacturing sector benefited from low wages in other
domestic sectors, namely domestically provided non-tradable and especially tradable services,
where real wages fell between 1995 and 2007, as well as from cheap imports (production inputs)
from abroad. Dustmann et. al further argue that Germany’s manufacturing sector may have
experienced increases in productivity which exceeded the increases in wages in the manufacturing
sector, since productivity increases in the manufacturing sector have exceeded the increases in the
two other sectors.
In Germany, the manufacturing sector comprised 21.6 percent of all jobs in 1995, but 17.7
percent of all jobs in 2007, while the value added of this sector (in current prices) remained
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essentially unchanged at 22.8 percent of all value added in 1995 compared with 22.7 percent of
value added in 2007 (Dustmann, Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener, 2014). So, the
manufacturing sector must rely to an increasing extent on inputs from other domestic sectors and
on imported inputs, because the share in final products has increased while the share in value added
has remained the same. Finally, to increase the competitiveness of its own fiscal products, the
manufacturing sector has made increased use of trade integration with Eastern European countries
through inputs imported from abroad, more so than other European countries. These inputs made
up 14.5 percent of total output in the manufacturing sector in 1995 and 21.5 percent in 2007
(Dustmann, Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener, 2014).
As such, in this view, Germany’s rising unit labor costs are not a counterargument to the
traditional link between low ULC and higher trade balances (and competitiveness), but more so an
expression of imperfect data representation.
Nonetheless, in an entirely opposite vein, as early as the 1970s, Kaldor (1978)
demonstrated that countries with the highest growth rates in GDP also tend to have increasing unit
labor costs, which is known as the ‘Kaldor paradox’ (Decramer, Fuss, Konings, 2016).
Similarly, Decramer, Fuss, and Konings, in their 2016 study of Belgium firms’ exports
reactions to changes in ULC, found that the elasticity of exports with regard to unit labor costs
varies between 0.29 and 0.40. Moreover, this elasticity differs across sectors and firms, with more
labor-intensive firms being more sensitive to changes in unit labor costs than firms that use more
capital and export mainly to the EU market. The financial and economic crisis affected exports,
but the elasticity of exports with respect to unit labor costs did not change (Decramer, Fuss,
Konings, 2016).
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The economists concluded that while their results show that unit labor costs have an impact
on the intensive and extensive margin of firm-level exports, the impact is rather low for the average
exporting firm. This suggests that pass-through of changes in labor costs into prices is low or that
demand is fairly inelastic with regard to prices, which indicates that other factors such as taste and
quality may be just as important to incorporate into indicators of competitiveness, as suggested by
recent trade models focusing on quality and taste parameters. Also, the finding that the elasticity
of exports with regard to unit labor costs is larger for labor-intensive firms suggest that cost
competitiveness is more important for these firms (Decramer, Fuss, Konings, 2016).
Section 3.1 The wage setting – ULC – exports link – Belgium as a counterexample to
mainstream economic competitiveness theory
From
the 12

Fig 2. Germany’s real wages evolution, from 1990-2008, across nontradable sectors and tradable manufacturing
and services; source: Dustmann, Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener, 2014

countries in the aforementioned Eurofound report for which the dominant tendency from 20082011 was decentralization of wage-setting mechanisms, the prevalent regime shifted from singleto multi-employer bargaining (recentralization) in two countries: Belgium and Finland. Whereas
Finland’s trade balance decreased from 2008-2011, corroborating the common view that
centralized wage bargaining hurts exports, Belgium’s current account increased after
recentralization (according to data from the IMF). Belgium’s trade balance evolution from 2008 is
therefore an interesting counterexample supporting this paper’s argument that there are aspects
other than wage-setting mechanisms contributing to a country’s net export level.
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Although data from the IMF and the ECB show that, similar to Germany, Belgium’s ULC
have risen since after the 2008 financial crisis, as Dustmann et al. have implicitly argued in their
aforementioned research, such does not provide enough information on the evolution of Belgian
wages for one to conclude that there is no link between Belgian ULC and exports with confidence.
I have therefore translated labor market data from the National Bank of Belgium and plotted the
graphs in figures three through five, which reflect the evolution of nominal wages across nontradable sectors and tradable manufacturing and services in the country from 2000-2017. The
method employed here is similar to that employed in Dustmann’s paper, to allow for comparisons
between German and Belgian data, but it is nonetheless inferior.

As in Dustmann’s paper, tradable manufacturing consists of manufacturing sectors for
which the export base is above the 25th percentile of Belgium’s total export volume while exports
of non-tradable sectors are below this threshold. In contrast, tradable services are not computed,
due to a lack of information on the export percentage of specific services. Instead, the wage
evolution across all tradable services is included. Inflation-adjusted real wages are shown and the
data dates from 2000 to 2017 (instead of indexed wage growth from 1990 to 2008 as in Dustmann’s
paper).
Since I
could
not
Tradable manufacturing
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enough
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Fig 3. Belgian real wage evolution, from 2000-2017 in tradable manufacturing sectors and specified by wage
percentile; constructed using data from the National Bank of Belgium
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information on manufacturing labor productivity to draft conclusions on Belgian unit labor costs
accurately, the graphs that follow only allow for wage evolution comparisons in Belgium versus
Germany.
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Fig 4. Belgian real wage evolution, from 2000-2017 in non-tradable sectors (bellow the 25th percentile
of total national export base) and specified by wage percentile; constructed using data from the
National Bank of Belgium
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Fig 5. Belgian real wage evolution, from 2000-2017 in services (all levels of total national export base) and
specified by wage percentile; constructed using data from the National Bank of Belgium
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According to data from the National Bank of Belgium and unlike the German pay rates
featured in Dustmann’s paper, Belgian real wages across all sectors and the 15th, 50th and 85th
percentiles have increased from 2000 to 2017. There are, thus, several conclusions to be drawn
from the graphs above. Firstly, the fact that wages had been following an upward trend since before
the 2008 wage-setting recentralization implies that more decentralized wage-setting systems do
not necessarily mean lower real wages and ULC; such also means that recentralization does not
imply higher wages and ULC. Secondly, because Belgian real wages have increased across
services and nontradable sectors, Dustmann’s conclusion that product costs of tradable
manufacturing can decrease due to the lower labor costs of those sectors that supply inputs to
tradable manufacturing does not apply to Belgium.
Note that only the evolution of real wages is analyzed here and that unit labor costs, that is
considerations of both wages and the evolution of labor productivity in Belgium are not made.
Ultimately, since both real wages and exports have increased after Belgium’s 2008 shift towards
recentralization, we can conclude that Belgian data contradicts the conventional wage-setting
mechanisms-wages-net exports link. As for the unit labor costs – net exports link, the graphs above
cannot be employed to fully support or contradict conventional economic theories. Nonetheless,
the aforementioned data on Belgium corroborates the view that policy recommendations for
increased decentralized wage-setting systems which rely on the argument that such mechanisms
will increase exports and competitiveness are flawed, their results depending on country-specific
characteristics.
One could argue that even though Belgian export levels have increased, they are still lower
than those of Germany (one could also argue Belgium is a smaller country, etc.) and that German
(more decentralized) labor markets are therefore superior. However, these arguments very
philosophically lead us back to the “what is competition?” question from the beginning of this read
by begging the question: with whom/what is each country competing: their own past export
performance or that of other countries? Those who answer “the former” will probably react
positively to the evolution of Belgium’s export levels and its 2008 wage-setting recentralization.
Those answering the later are more likely to argue that Belgium’s turn towards recentralization
has not succeeded in significantly boosting its competitiveness.
Section 4.0 What other factors influence export performance?
The data and arguments presented in the previous sections should lean even those at the higher
end of the stubbornness distribution to agreeing that several factors other than ULCs determine the
attractiveness of a given country’s exports. Indeed, parameters, such as product quality, real
exchange rates, rising global demand, variations in the business cycle, and resistance to imports
also play an important role in explaining the evolution of countries’ net exports.
In 2005, the IMF published the report Explaining Differences in External Sector
Performance Among Large Euro Area Countries, which analyzed the evolution of the traditional
determinants of exports and imports during 2001-2004 in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The
publication concluded that the countries’ imports are well explained by domestic and foreign
demand for said imports, while competitiveness across different imported goods played is not as
relevant. All countries’ export levels rose due to rising global demand (globalization and the
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opening of foreign markets), with Spain profiting the most and France the least. Similarly, all
countries experienced real exchange rate appreciation, with Italy suffering the most (its exports
became more expensive to foreigners and therefore decreased) and Germany the least. The report
refers to an “unexplained part of exports”, which was positive for Germany and negative for the
other three countries.
As such, not only does the above IMF report indicate that big European countries’ exports
are affected by factors other than ULC, but that German exports in particular seem to be preferred
to other nation’s goods. A reason for foreigners’ preferential taste for German products could be
the higher quality of their products. Indeed, on their 2014 study on France and Germany’s import
demand (resistance) Thanagopal and Le Mouel test this hypothesis by comparing the ability of
France and Germany to resist foreign competition. After a comparison of French and German
products’ reality quality and prices, they conclude that German products (especially in sectors
producing highly differentiated products) employ better competitive practices than French ones,
because they tend to be less substitutable and highly differentiated vis-à-vis their foreign
counterparts (Thanagopal and Le Mouel, 2014). These results point towards product differentiation
as the key to strong exports and suggest that policy-makers should encourage enterprises to invest
in technology, research, and higher-quality inputs to entice foreigners’ appetite for their products.
Section 5.0 How do differential ULC and net exports across Europe affect the EMU?
Economic research on the influence of cost competitiveness on national growth has been partly
triggered by ongoing debates about growing imbalances in the euro area as these are attributed to
negative current accounts in economically weaker countries in opposition to large positive ones in
stronger European economies. Some economists have even gone as far as arguing that Germany,
as the largest economy in the EU, has the responsibility to purposely raise its ULC to correct such
imbalances.
Under the EMU, each individual member state must attempt to meet the ECB’s inflation
target of close to but below 2%. However, meeting a common inflation target entails constraints
which can be detrimental to member countries, some of which related to the evolution of labor
costs, because these are important in determining the inflation rate. The increase in European ULC
should have been compatible with the EU’s inflation target. Instead, during the past 11 years a
group of countries in the euro area has reported unit labor cost increases close to the EMU average
- Finland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria. By contrast, Germany’s average unit
labor cost increase - merely 0.6% - is far below from the ECB’s target. At the same time, the
evolution of ULC (which have been significantly corrected) in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland and
Spain constituted relevant upward deviations from the euro area average until the onset of the 2008
crisis (Niechoj, Stein, Stephan, and Zwiener, 2011).
As Torsten Niechoj, Ulrike Stein, Sabine Stephan, and Rudolf Zwiener’s conclude in their
2011 paper German labour costs: A source of instability in the euro area: “It is not sufficient for
the respective countries to reach the low unit labor cost growth of Germany, as this would not help
to improve the domestic competitiveness vis-á-vis Germany… Preserving the European Monetary
Union in its current composition and avoiding a transfer union, is only possible, if wage inflation

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/13

16

Pedro Fernandes: Belgium’s 2008 recentralization of wage-setting mechanisms

in Germany exceeds 2 % for several years”. The aforementioned economists seem to thus belong
to the group of advocates for uniform ULC in the EMU at the expense of higher German wages.
Despite the fact that policy recommendations towards greater equality of ULC in Europe differ
there seems to be a broad agreement that unequal labor costs across the EU are one source of
economic inequalities in the union and that measures should be taken in order reduce such
differences.
Conclusion
Given that a broad agreement on “the one true” definition of international competitiveness is most
likely impossible to reach, it is the responsibility of each national government to design its own
definition of the concept and craft an economic agenda consisting of policies aimed at improving
their country’s specific competitiveness conditions. International competitive is an inherently
political concept, and as such policy makers and policy supervising institutions should consider
writing recommendations tailored to different countries’ economic characteristics and
investment/developmental needs and wants. Ultimately, countries might become competitive
(whatever this means) by investing in underdeveloped areas or taking advantage of those
sectors/activities/resources at which they have a comparative advantage, differentiating
themselves and their products from those of other nations, not by mimicking policies which
worked well in addressing general labor-market issues (not even necessarily competitiveness) in
other nations (but only due to those nations’ specific economic environments). Thus far, however,
to increase countries’ competitiveness these institutions have mostly advocated for
decentralization of wage-setting mechanisms, based on how successful decentralization was in
reducing Germany’s unemployment.
The historical prevalence of the rationale that lower wages imply cheap exports, which in
turn mean higher net exports has greatly influenced institutions like the IMF, the EU Commission
and the ECB. Nonetheless, several countries constitute counterexamples to the widely accepted
view that decentralization of wage-setting mechanisms leads to higher net exports, Belgium being
the particular case analyzed in this paper. Belgium’s wage evolution after centralization of wagesetting mechanisms is proof that country idiosyncrasies are an important factor affecting economic
policies’ efficiency and that unconventional policy routes (wage-bargaining centralization for
example) can be just as beneficial as conventional ones. Rather than advocating that centralized
wage-setting increases exports or that decentralization is inefficient, this paper aims at questioning
the definition of competitiveness itself and argues that establishing straightforward causal chains
between wage-setting mechanisms and exports is erroneous. Consequently, national governments
as well as EU institutions would probably benefit from incorporating directives targeted at
improving more general economic factors other than wages in their policy packages, namely
research and innovation, technology, and product quality and differentiability.
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